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CHANGED ASSUMPTIONS: DISENTANGLING TITLE I
REMEDIAL EDUCATION AT PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS
Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997)
John S. Simons* **
Petitioners,' the Board of Education of the City School District of
the City of New York, used funds received under Title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 19652 to establish a
remedial education program for children from low income families
within the school district.3 As part of the Title I program, public school
teachers were sent to parochial schools to provide instruction to
qualified students.4 The Title I program was limited to guidance
services and remedial instruction in reading, mathematics, and English
as a second language.5
Respondents, a group of six federal taxpayers, filed suit in the Eastem District of New York seeking to enjoin the placement of public
school teachers on parochial school grounds under the Title I program
as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitu-

* Editor's Note: This Case Comment won the George W. Milam Outstanding Case
Comment Award for the Fall 1997 semester.
** This Case Comment is dedicated to my wife Lynn and to my children, Joshua and
Abigail. I owe them more gratitude than I can ever express.
1. This Comment refers to the Chancellorof the Board of Education of the City of New
York and the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York as the
"Petitioners" in Agostini v. Felton. See Brief for Petitioners Chancellor and Board of Education
of the City of New York at ii, Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (Nos. 96-552, 96-553).
Other petitioners included the United States Secretary of Education and a group of parents whose
children attended parochial schools in New York City and were eligible to receive remedial
instruction under the Title I program. See Brief for Petitioners Rachel Agostini, et al. at ii (Nos.
96-552, 96-553).
2. Recodified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301-8962 (1994). The current legislation contains no
changes relevant to the Court's analysis from the initial 1965 legislation. Agostini v. Felton, 117
S. Ct. 1997, 2003 n.* (1997).
3. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 404 (1985), vacated, Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.
Ct. 1997 (1997); Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003-04.
4. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 406. Under the requirements of the Improving America's
Schools Act of 1994, a student is eligible to participate in a Title I program only if the student
resides within the attendance boundaries of a public school in a low-income area and is failing,
or at risk of failing the State's student performance standards. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6313(a)(2)(A),
6315(b)(1)(B) (1994).
5. See Aguilar,473 U.S. at 406.
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tion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

Petitioners, upholding the program.7 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed, finding that the program created an
excessive entanglement between church and state.8 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the circuit court's
holding.9 On remand, the district court entered a permanent injunction
prohibiting the Petitioners from allowing public school teachers to
instruct any students on parochial school grounds.'0
Twelve years later, the Petitioners filed a motion for relief from the
injunction pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." The district court denied this motion and the circuit court

6. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2005; accordAguilar,473 U.S. at 407. Respondents argued
that the program subsidized the religious function of parochial schools by providing instruction
in certain subjects which the schools would otherwise be required to provide. See Brief for
Respondents at 14 (Nos. 96-552, 96-553). The Respondents also contended that the program
created a symbolic union between the board of education and the parochial schools. See id.
The same group of taxpayers was involved in litigation challenging the constitutionality of
the alternative program instituted by Petitioners in response to the injunction issued by the
district court, which relied on education in mobile educational units parked in front of the
parochial schools. See Transcript of Oral Arguments at 42-43 (Nos. 96-552, 96-553). The case
was suspended at the Second Circuit Court of Appeals pending the outcome of the instant case.
See id. at 45.
7. See Aguilar,473 U.S. at 407.
8. See id. at 408; see also Felton v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Educ., 739 F2d
48, 72 (2d Cir. 1984).
9. See Aguilar,473 U.S. at 408.
10. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003.
11. See id. One of the issues before the Court in Agostini was whether it is appropriate
to use Rule 60(b)(5) to bring a Supreme Court decision for review by the Court twelve years
after the decision was published. See id. at 2006. Rule 60(b) provides in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the [district] court may relieve a party
or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: .. . (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated,
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
The Court ruled that it was appropriate for a party to use Rule 60(b)(5) to seek review of
a case, in which the judgment has prospective application, and subsequent decisions from the
Supreme Court indicate that jurisprudence on the issue has changed. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at
2006-07. Justice Ginsburg dissented, arguing that Rule 60(b)(5) should not be allowed to operate
as a motion for rehearing years after the Court's opinion has been published. See id. at 2026
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). However, the Court granted a rehearing of its own decision in one
other case. In Gondeck v. Pan Am. World Airways, the Court granted a petition for rehearing
three years after the Court had denied certiorari. 382 U.S. 25, 28 (1965), rev'g, 371 U.S. 856
(1962) (denying petition for rehearing), rev'g 370 U.S. 918 (1962) (denying certiorari), and
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affirmed.12 Once again, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 3 The Court determined that the Title I program, as enacted
by Petitioners, contained sufficient safeguards to prevent its violation of
the Establishment Clause 4 and HELD, that remedial instruction by
public school teachers on parochial school grounds does not violate the
Establishment Clause where there are safeguards to prevent the teachers
from teaching or fostering religion.' 5
The United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make
, The seminal case
no law respecting an establishment of religion .. "6
in analyzing legislation under the Establishment Clause is Lemon v.
Kurtzman. 7 Lemon involved a challenge to the constitutionality of two
state programs that provided direct subsidies to parochial schools."8
One of the programs challenged in Lemon was a Rhode Island program
that provided a salary subsidy to teachers at non-public schools. 9 The
Rhode Island program required the participating schools to submit
financial data to the state showing which funds were attributable to
secular education as opposed to religious activities. 0 Additionally, any
teacher who applied for a salary supplement under the program was
required to agree in writing not to teach any religion courses while
receiving the supplement.2 '
Also at issue in Lemon was a Pennsylvania program through which
the state paid for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional
materials for secular classes offered at parochial schools.22 Under the
granting cert. and rev'g, United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 299 F2d 74 (5th Cir.
1962). The instant case is unique in its use of Rule 60(b)(5) to bring a case back to the Court
for consideration of whether subsequent case law has undermined the original decision. See
Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2026 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Justice Ginsburg further stated that deciding the case was inappropriate since Court rules
prohibit rehearing a case except at the instance of a justice who had concurred in the judgment
of decision. See id.(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Agostini was not heard at the instance

of Justice Stevens, the only member of the instant court who had concurred in Aguilar).
12. See Agostin4 117 S. Ct. at 2006. The Court stated that it was appropriate for the
district court and circuit court to deny relief to petitioners, since the decision of the Court in
Aguilar remained the law until it was directly overturned by the Court. See id at 2017.

13. See id. at 2006.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See id. at 2016.
See id.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).

18. See id. at 606-07.
19. See idLat 607. The program was limited to non-public schools with lower spending
per student than public schools. See id.

20. See id. at 607-08.
21. See id. at 608.
22. See id at 609.
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Pennsylvania program, the schools seeking state funds were required to
maintain records that identified the separate costs of secular and
religious classes.23 These records were subject to state audit.24
The Supreme Court determined that both state programs challenged
in Lemon violated the Establishment Clause.2 ' The Court announced a
three-part test to determine if similar programs violate the Establishment
Clause.26 According to this test, a program is permissible only if it has
"a secular legislative purpose," a principal or primary effect "that neither
advances nor inhibits religion," and the program "must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.' ,27 The Court found
that both programs violated the Establishment Clause because they
created an excessive entanglement of government with religion.28 The
Court based this ruling primarily on the amount of state surveillance
over the budgets and instruction at parochial schools that was required
by the programs.29
In 1985, fourteen years after Lemon, the Court was faced with the
issue of publicly-employed teachers providing remedial instruction on
parochial school grounds in the companion cases School District of
Grand Rapids v. Ball and Aguilar v. Felton.3" The Court ruled that the
programs in question fostered excessive entanglement between government and religion.3 This entanglement was based on several factors.
First, the Court stated that public school teachers might use public funds
for religious educational purposes.12 The Court reasoned that government funded education, even if secular in nature, would create a
symbolic union of church and state when provided in a parochial
school.33 Aid that funded programs which parochial schools would
otherwise have to provide was a subsidy of religious education.34
Further, pervasive supervision was required to ensure that the teachers

23. See id. at 609-10.
24. See id. at 610.
25. See id. at 606-07, 625.
26. See id. at 612-13.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 616-17, 620-21.
29. See id. at 619, 620-21.
30. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1985), overruled in part
by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997); Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 406, vacated, Agostini v.
Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997). The reasoning in Ball is incorporated by reference into the
Aguilar decision. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 408-09.
31. See Aguilar,473 U.S. at 414; Ball, 473 U.S. at 397.
32. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 388.
33. See id. at 390-92.
34. See id. at 395-96.
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would not present a religious message." Finally, because the program
in Aguilar required instruction to be provided in rooms that did not
contain any religious symbols, the schools would be required to follow
public authorities' determination of what constituted a religious
symbol. 6
Nine years after its decisions in Aguilar and Ball, the Court was
asked to decide whether state funds could be used to pay for a signlanguage interpreter for a deaf student who attended a parochial school
in Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothills School District.37 Petitioner argued that
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)" and the Free
Exercise Clause required the school district to provide a sign language
interpreter to enable him to attend the school of his choice.39 The Free
Exercise Clause reads: "Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion]."' James Zobrest sought to exercise his
religion by attending a Roman Catholic high school.4
The school district argued that the Establishment Clause prohibited
the placement of a public employee at a parochial school because it
would tend to inculcate religion and create an excessive entanglement
of government and religion.42 The Court ruled that there was no
excessive entanglement because the interpreter would only repeat what
was said by the teachers and would not add any religious content.43
The Court further stated that the presence of a public employee did not
create an excessive entanglement where the employee is there as part of
a program that provides benefits to a broad class of citizens, and it is
only the taxpayer's choice that causes the benefit to be provided at a
parochial school."

35. See Aguilar,473 U.S. at 412-13.

36. See id. at 413.
37. 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993).
38. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994).
39. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
42. See id. at 5.
43. See id. at 13 (distinguishing a sign language interpreter from a teacher or guidance
counselor).
44. See id at 12. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind, where the Court ruled that the provision of tuition
assistance to a student attending a religious college was permissible because the funds were
available to a broad class of persons and only indirectly benefitted the religious college through
the private choice of an individual. See id. at 12-13; see also Witters v. Washington Dep't of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986).
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In the instant case, the Supreme Court reconsidered its holding in
Aguilar.45 The Court determined that the decision in Aguilar was based
on four assumptions which were developed in earlier cases, but which
have since been undermined.' First, the Aguilar and Ball decisions
presumed that public teachers at parochial schools, which were
"pervasively sectarian," would either intentionally or inadvertently
inculcate religious beliefs.4 7 The instant Court rejected this presumption, relying on Zobrest to show that the presence of a public employee
at a parochial school is no longer presumed to inculcate religion.48 The
Zobrest Court instead assumed that the interpreter would faithfully
perform the requirements of the job without adding or subtracting
religious content.49 The Court applied this same assumption to the
instant case."
Second, the Court questioned the presumption from Ball and Aguilar
that government aid which directly benefits the educational function of
parochial schools fosters an excessive entanglement." Based on Witters
v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind52 and Zobrest, the
Court held that when a benefit is available to a broad class of persons,
and benefits a parochial school as the result of entirely private decisions,
45. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003. The Court also reconsidered part of its holding in
Ball. See id. at 2008-10.
46. See id. at 2010.
47. See id. at 2010-11 (stating that Zobrest had clearly dismissed any notion that there was
an absolute bar against public employees being placed at parochial schools); see also Aguilar,
473 U.S. at 411-12; Ball, 473 U.S. at 385. For other cases assuming inculcation of religious
beliefs, see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367, 372 (1975) (holding that program which
provided remedial instruction and other services for parochial school children at the parochial
schools was invalid) and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248 (1977) (upholding remedial
education for parochial school children at sites away from parochial schools).
48. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010-11 (citing Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13). In Zobrest, the
Court had ruled that a state-employed sign language interpreter may be placed at a parochial
school, without any presumption that the interpreter would inculcate religion. See Zobrest, 509
U.S. at 13. The Zobrest Court specifically refused to presume that the interpreter would not
faithfully transmit the lectures without adding or subtracting any religious message. See id.
49. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2011; Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13.
50. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2011. Justice Souter, however, argued that the majority
misread Zobrest. See id. at 2022 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter suggested that Zobrest
should be limited to situations where the public employee is not called upon to present an
independent message or lesson. See id. at 2023 (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a signlanguage interpreter functions "more like a hearing aid than a teacher"). The Court, however,
rejected Justice Souter's argument by noting that the Zobrest Court had searched the record in
that case for any evidence that the interpreter had changed the message of the lecture in the
interpretation. See id. at 2011 (stating that the "interpreter had the same opportunity to inculcate
religion" as a teacher).
51. See id. at 2011-12.
52. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
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there is no impermissible financing of indoctrination.53 The Court
reasoned that even though the Title I employees did provide a financial
benefit to the school, the benefit did not result in an impermissible
government sponsorship of religion.' Additionally, the Court determined that the benefit involved was the type of service that the
parochial school was not likely to provide in the absence of the stateprovided benefit."
Third, the Court addressed whether placing public employees on
parochial school grounds creates a symbolic union of church and
state. 6 The Court found that Zobrest had repudiated the notion that the
presence of public employees at parochial schools creates such a
union. 7 The Court refused to allow the location of instruction to
control its constitutionality.
Finally, the Court considered the presumption that "pervasive
monitoring" would be necessary to prevent Title I teachers from
furthering religion. 9 The Court did not accept the argument that the
Title I program would require pervasive supervision of the teachers in
order to prevent them from inculcating religion because it had rejected
the presumption that public employees on parochial school grounds

53. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2011-12; see also Witters, 474 U.S. at 487; Zobrest, 509
U.S. at 10. Justice Souter would not apply the decisions from Witters and Zobrest to the instant
case. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2023-25 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter argues that these
two cases were more limited than the majority opinion suggests. See id. at 2024-25 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter emphasizes that in each case only one taxpayer received the benefit,
and only after making application for the benefit. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). In the instant
case, thousands of students receive Title I instruction under the program at bar and receive the
benefits without having to make any special application. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
54. See Agostin4 117 S. Ct. at 2011-12 (citing Zobrest and Witters).
55. See id at 2012-13. Justice Souter contends that the Title I program does supplant the
programs that parochial schools would otherwise be required to provide. See id at 2024 (Souter,
J., dissenting). The Court counters that this is mere speculation and is not based on any evidence
in the record. See id. at 2013.
56. See id at 2012; see also Bal4 473 U.S. at 391-92 (stating that students would see a
"powerful symbol of state endorsement and encouragement of religio[n]" when public school
teachers teach at parochial schools).
57. See Agostin4 117 S. Ct. at 2012. Justice Souter, however, reasoned that Zobrest was
not dispositive on this issue because it is the public teachers' instruction within sectarian schools
which creates the excessive entanglement, not their mere presence at the school. See id. at 2023
(Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Ball and Aguilar ). The Court, however, noted that the question
came down only to location because there was no question that the instruction is permissible
when located in a van parked on the street in front of the school. See id. at 2012 (stating that
the degree of cooperation between parochial school teachers and Title I teachers is the same
regardless of the location of the Title I instruction).
58. See id.
59. See id. at 2014-16.
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would inculcate religion.' Pervasive monitoring was not presumed
necessary; therefore, it cannot establish an excessive entanglement. 6'
Having rejected the four presumptions underlying the Aguilar and
Ball decisions, the Court turned to the remaining allegations of
entanglement.62 The Court decided that the coordination of services
between the Petitioners and parochial schools does not create excessive
entanglement.63 The same coordination occurs when the program is
offered off campus, which is permissible.' The Court also was
unpersuaded by the suggestion that the political divisiveness created by
the program was an excessive entanglement. 65 The Court ruled that the
Title I program, as established by the Petitioners, did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.'
The decision in the instant case reflects a change of ideas on the
Court, as it no longer accepts the assumptions of the Aguilar and Ball
decisions.67 These assumptions essentially undermined the three-part
test of the Lemon decision.68 Under the analysis of Aguilar and Ball,
the Court presumed that a program would further religion and determined that this potential risk would foster excessive entanglement.69
This made the second part of the Lemon test-whether a program has
an effect of advancing or inhibiting religion-irrelevant because it had
been encompassed by the excessive entanglement portion of the test.7"
In Lemon, the excessive entanglement existed because the government actually supervised the spending at parochial schools and actually
had to inquire into the instruction that was done by parochial school
teachers.71 In Aguilar and Ball, the Court presumed excessive entanglement because the government might have to pervasively monitor Title

60. See id. at 2015-16.
61. Seeid.
62. See id. at 2015.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 2016.
67. See id. at 2015-16.
68. See hi.
69. See id. at 2014-16.
70. The analysis of excessive entanglement does involve the same factors as the analysis
of effect. See id. at 2015. In determining both aspects of the Lemon test, the Court examines the
character of the institution benefitted and the nature of the aid. See id. The analysis must focus
on whether the entanglement is excessive, and therefore has the effect of advancing or hindering
religion. See id The presumptions entered into by the Aguilar court raised the specter of
possible entanglement, which was then elevated to the status of excessive entanglement. See id
This led to the wrong conclusion in Aguilar. See id. at 2015-16.
71. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619, 620-21.
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I teachers, the government would have to coordinate services with
parochial schools, and the program might be politically divisive.72 By
removing the presumptions of Aguilar and Ball, the Agostini Court
looked to the actual primary effect of the program, and whether the
program actually fostered excessive entanglement, focusing on whether
the government's decisions advanced or inhibited religion.73
Agostini v. Felton represents a continuing shift in constitutional
jurisprudence.74 It does not, however, represent an opening of the
flood-gates to future entanglements.75 The Court required that any
future program placing public school teachers on parochial school
grounds to provide instruction must contain safeguards to prevent the
impermissible instruction of religion.76 A program must not provide an
incentive for parents or students to choose a sectarian education or to
modify their religious beliefs. 7
The Agostini Court also required that funds that might benefit
religion must be controlled by a public agency.78 This important factor
distinguishes the instant case from Lemon. In Lemon, the state programs
provided aid directly to the parochial schools, which was used to
supplement the salaries of teachers at the schools.7 9 Additionally, the
programs in Lemon provided funds that parochial schools used for the

72. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2015.
73. See id. at 2014, 2016.
74. See id. at 2017 (stating that the interpretation of the Establishment Clause has
significantly changed since Aguilar). Additionally, Agostini could represent a new procedure in
constitutional law where dicta becomes the basis for a change in the law. The Petitioners in
Agostini decided to file the motion to modify the permanent injunction after five justices joined
in opinions that called for the reconsideration of Aguilar. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 717-18 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("'he
court should, in a proper case, reconsider Aguilar, in order to bring our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence back to what I think is the proper track-government impartiality, not animosity,
towards religion."); id. at 731 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ('The decisions in Grand Rapids and
Aguilar may have been erroneous. In light of the case before us, and in the interest of sound
elaboration of constitutional doctrine, it may be necessary for us to reconsider them at a later
date."); id. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas, J.)("I heartily
agree that ...[the Ball and Aguilar] cases, so hostile to our national tradition of accommodation, should be overruled at the earliest opportunity...."). The dicta included in Kiryas Joel
arguably has become constitutional law through petitioner's use of Rule 60(b)(5) to challenge
the Aguilar holding.
75. See supra note 11.
76. See Agostini, 117 S.Ct. at 2016.
77. See id. at 2014.
78. See id. at 2013. The federal funds at issue were paid to a local educational agency,
which provided services directly to the eligible students. Id.
79. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 49

expenses of their regular curriculum." In the instant case, the funds
were only used for remedial programs.8 ' The statute that established the
program specifically provided that the funds were to supplement and not
replace programs at the parochial schools.82 Finally, the funds could not
be used to establish school-wide programs at parochial schools.8 3 The
programs could only benefit those students who were eligible to
participate.84
Agostini thus leaves the holding of Lemon intact and continues to
recognize that excessive entanglement between government and religion
violates the Establishment Clause.8 ' As a result of abandoning the
presumptions of Aguilar and Ball, the Court can now look to the actual
harm caused by an alleged entanglement of government and religion. 6
There must be evidence that the risk of harm is real. The Court has
not removed the "wall of separation" between church and state; 8 any
program that would provide a real risk of indoctrination should still be
struck down by the courts.8 9
The Court has perhaps begun to consider how the Free Exercise
Clause interacts with the Establishment Clause." Sending a child to a
parochial school can be a religious decision. If the programs of Title I
are unavailable, or impractical at a parochial school, then the government has begun to infringe on the freedom of religious choice by
implicitly encouraging parents not to send their children to parochial
schools.9" The Agostini Court's modified approach to excessive
entanglement will allow greater involvement between state agencies and
parochial schools and will balance the needs of students at parochial

80. Id. at 608, 610.
81. See Agostin, 117 S. Ct. at 2003 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6315(c)(1)(A)).
82. See id. at 2004 (citing 34 C.FR. § 200.12(a) (1996)).
83. See id. (citing 34 C.FR. § 200.12(b) (1996)).
84. See id. (citing 34 C.ER. § 200.12(b) (1996)).
85. See id. at 2015. The Court stated, however, that not all entanglements have the effect
of furthering or hindering religion. Id. It is only excessive entanglement that violates the
Establishment Clause. Id.
86. See id. at 2011.
87. See id. at 2012. The Court stated that it would not presume that Title I instructors are
"uncontrollable and sometimes very unprofessional" as counsel for the Respondents had
suggested during oral arguments. Id (quoting Transcript of Oral Arguments at 39).
88. But see South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 715 (N.J. 1997) ("A major crack occurred in the 'wall
of separation' on June 23, 1997, when the United States Supreme Court decided Agostini v.
Felton.").
89. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2016.
90. See supra notes 16, 40 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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schools with establishment concerns. In the long run, these new
assumptions will reduce the separation between church and state while
still providing sufficient limitations to prevent excessive entanglement.9

92. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
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